Beyond Investigation: The Unconstitutionality Of Unilateral ‘Wanted’ Notices By Law Enforcement Agencies In Nigeria
By Mobolaji Kuti, Clinton Elochukwu Wilson-Okereke, Ayomide Abosede Sonaike, who are members of the Dispute Resolution Group and the White-Collar Crimes Investigation team of Babalakin & Co.
INTRODUCTION
Over time, law enforcement agencies in Nigeria have, under the pretext of discharging their statutory responsibilities, developed a troubling practice of unilaterally declaring individuals suspected of criminal offences as “wanted.” This practice, often executed through media publications and public notices, is frequently undertaken without prior judicial authorization or adherence to established procedural safeguards. While it is commonly justified as a necessary tool for crime detection and public awareness, its increasing normalization raises serious constitutional and legal concerns. Chief among these are its implications for the presumption of innocence, the right to dignity of the human person, and the right to fair hearing as guaranteed under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). In many instances, individuals so declared are subjected to public opprobrium, reputational damage, and, in some cases, extrajudicial consequences, all before any formal determination of guilt. This article examines the legality and constitutionality of this practice, which has become commonplace across different law enforcement agencies in Nigeria.
UNDERSTANDING THE RATIONALE BEHIND WANTED NOTICES BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
Before delving into the substance of this article, it is important to understand the common legal basis proffered by law enforcement agencies in declaring suspects “wanted”. The most prevalent justification amongst law enforcement agencies is that they are empowered by their enabling statutes to take necessary steps in the aid of their investigations. The justification for a law enforcement agency like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC or the Commission) for instance, is rooted in section 7(1)(a) of the EFCC Act, which empowers the Commission to “cause investigations to be conducted as to whether any person, corporate body or organisation has committed an offence under this Act or other law relating to economic and financial crimes.”
The interpretation accorded to the provision of section 7(1)(a) of the EFCC Act by the EFCC is that that in the conduct of its investigations, it can declare persons suspected of the commission of an offence “wanted”.
This interpretation is problematic, and if allowed to fester, raises the question of “how far can a law enforcement agency be allowed to go in the course of its investigation?” This question and the potentially limitless extent that law enforcement agencies can go under the guise of “investigations”, and the implications of such extents on the citizens’ rights have made it imperative to ensure that guard rails exist to check the law enforcement agencies.
This article argues that such unilateral declarations constitute executive overreach, violate constitutional guarantees of dignity and liberty, undermine the presumption of innocence, and offend due process.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING “WANTED” DECLARATIONS
The Black’s Law Dictionary[1] defines a “wanted person” as one sought by a law enforcement agency because the person has escaped from custody or because an arrest warrant has been issued for their arrest. The definition is instructive. It ties the legal status of being “wanted” to two specific scenarios: escape from lawful custody, or the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The concept of a “wanted” person is not an administrative label that a law enforcement agency may deploy at will; it is a legal status that presupposes prior judicial authorization. Where no warrant of arrest has been issued and no escape from lawful custody has occurred, a unilateral declaration that a citizen is “wanted” lacks juridical foundation and amounts to executive overreach.
This conclusion is reinforced by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) which guarantees fundamental rights that circumscribe investigative and enforcement powers.
Section 34(1)(a) provides:
“Every individual is entitled to respect for the dignity of his person, and accordingly—
(a) no person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment.”
Section 35(1) provides:
“Every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of such liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure permitted by law —”
Section 35(2) further provides:
“Any person who is arrested or detained shall have the right to remain silent or avoid answering any question until after consultation with a legal practitioner or any other person of his own choice.”
A unilateral “wanted” declaration goes against all of these constitutional guarantees. It functions as a public declaration of suspected criminality and carries serious reputational consequences even where arrest has not occurred. The seriousness underscores why such declarations must be subject to judicial supervision.
The Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) operationalizes these constitutional safeguards by confining coercive power to judicial instruments. A warrant of arrest or a public summons may compel attendance, but only after a judicial officer has determined that legal grounds exist. Courts act as neutral arbiters, ensuring that suspicion is tested against legal standards before the state publicly marks a citizen for apprehension. When an investigative agency bypasses this process and issues a “wanted” notice on its own authority, it assumes a role that the law assigns to the judiciary. This is not a mere procedural error; it is structural overreach, blurring the line between investigation and judicial authorization.
THE STATUTORY POSITION AND DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2015
The Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 (ACJA) clearly delineates the lawful mechanisms through which a suspect may be compelled to appear before a court. Section 114 of the ACJA provides that “in every case, the court may proceed either by way of summons to the defendant or by way of warrant for his arrest in the first instance according to the nature and circumstances of the case.” The operative word is may indicating that the choice of process lies within the discretion of the court, to be exercised having regard to the gravity of the offence and the surrounding circumstances.
The implication of this provision is significant. The law recognizes only two judicial instruments for compelling attendance: a summons and a warrant of arrest.
Warrant of Arrest
A warrant of arrest is a formal written authority issued by a judge or magistrate to a police officer or to any other person directing him to arrest the person named in the warrant. The statutory framework governing this process is set out in Sections 36 to 40 of the ACJA, which regulate both the issuance and execution of warrants.
Under these provisions, a warrant may be directed either to a named police officer or to police officers generally. However, the ACJA also contemplates situations requiring urgent action. Accordingly, where immediate execution is necessary and no police officer is readily available, the court may direct the warrant to another suitable person for execution[2].
In essence, the statutory scheme underscores a fundamental principle: the coercive power of arrest, when exercised through judicial process, derives its legitimacy from the court. Investigative agencies may initiate complaints or apply for warrants, but the authority to compel the liberty of a citizen through judicial process remains exclusively vested in the Court.
Public Summons
A summons is an order in writing commanding the person named therein to appear before the court on a named date and time to answer to allegations of crime. It is usually issued in respect of minor offences upon a complaint by a Police officer and need not be on oath. It is issued in writing, in duplicates and signed by the presiding officer of such Court or by such other officer, as the Chief Judge may prescribe.[3]
Sections 41 and 42 of the ACJA provide for the issuance of a public summons. Such summons must:
Critically, the statutory framework contemplates that a public summons is a judicial act. Section 41 empowers only the court to issue a public summons through newspapers or other means where a suspect, against whom a warrant of arrest has been issued, absconds or conceals himself. The issuance of a valid warrant of arrest is therefore a condition precedent to any subsequent public declaration aimed at compelling attendance.
The structure of the ACJA admits of no ambiguity. The authority to compel a defendant’s appearance whether by warrant or by public summons resides exclusively in the court. Any attempt by an investigative agency to declare a person “wanted” without first invoking and obtaining judicial process finds no support in the statutory scheme and stands in direct conflict with the procedural safeguards enacted by the legislature.
The Federal High Court, coram Honourable Justice Deinde Dipeolu examined this issue in the case of Margareth Emefiele v. Executive Chairman, EFCC & Anor., where it held thus:
“Flowing from the provision of Section 41 above, it is only the Court and not the Respondents or any other agency that has the power to publish summons in writing where a person who is alleged to have committed a crime absconded or concealed him or herself so that a warrant cannot be executed against him or her. The Respondents’ act of declaring the Applicant wanted on their website is a flagrant disobedience of the clear provisions of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act having subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court by applying for a warrant to arrest and detain the Applicant.”
The decision of the Federal High Court in Margareth Emefiele v. Executive Chairman, EFCC & Anor. has also been affirmed by the Court of Appeal in the case of Executive Chairman, EFCC & Anor v. Emefiele (2025) LPELR – 81842 (CA) in the following words:
“I cannot fault the lower Court’s findings here. The Respondents cannot argue that the intendment of the lawmaker is for a person, without formal notification or invitation, can be declared wanted without recourse to the Court under Section 41 of the ACJA 2015 where a warrant is procured.”
Similarly, in the earlier decision of the Federal High Court in Suit No. FCT/HC/BW/CV/23/2017 – Mr. Benedict Peters v. Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, the Court, coram Hon. Justice O. Musa, held that the EFCC’s act of declaring the Applicant a wanted person on its official website without any prior order or leave of a court of competent jurisdiction was unlawful, illegal, wrongful, ultra vires, unconstitutional, and constituted a flagrant violation of the fundamental rights of the Applicant to personal liberty, private and family life, freedom of movement etc.
Additionally, in the case of Suit No. FHC/KD/CS/88/2025 – Alhaji Rabiu Tijani v. Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, the court held that it was illegal for the EFCC to have declared the Applicant wanted on its social media platform, without first obtaining an order of court.
In response to the practice of law enforcement agencies in declaring persons suspected of the commission of offences “wanted”, Nigeria’s legal jurisprudence has gradually evolved. Thus, Nigerian Courts have increasingly clarified that the powers of law enforcement agencies do not extend to publicly declaring a citizen “wanted” without having first obtained an order of a Court.
CONCLUSION
In a constitutional democracy governed by the rule of law, the exercise of state power, particularly coercive power, must remain firmly anchored within the bounds of legality and judicial oversight. The practice by law enforcement agencies in Nigeria of unilaterally declaring individuals “wanted,” in the absence of a prior judicial authorization, represents a clear departure from these foundational principles. As demonstrated, neither the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) nor the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 confers such sweeping authority on investigative bodies. Rather, the law carefully delineates the processes through which a citizen may be compelled to answer allegations of criminal conduct, vesting such powers exclusively in the courts.
Judicial pronouncements, including the decisions in Margareth Emefiele v. Executive Chairman, EFCC & Anor., Executive Chairman, EFCC & Anor v. Emefiele, and Benedict Peters v. EFCC, have unequivocally affirmed that the declaration of a person as “wanted” without recourse to the courts is unlawful, unconstitutional, and amounts to an abuse of executive power. These decisions underscore a consistent judicial stance: that investigative convenience cannot trump constitutional guarantees.
Ultimately, the unilateral branding of citizens as “wanted” not only erodes the presumption of innocence but also inflicts irreversible reputational harm and exposes individuals to potential abuse. If left unchecked, this practice risks normalizing executive arbitrariness under the guise of law enforcement. It is therefore imperative that law enforcement agencies operate strictly within the confines of the law by seeking appropriate judicial authorization before making any public declarations that affect the rights and liberties of citizens. The preservation of due process is not a procedural technicality. It is the bedrock upon which justice, fairness, and public confidence in the legal system depend.
Babalakin & Co. is a firm with extensive experience in matters relating to White Collar Crimes Investigations. If you have any questions or would like information on the issues discussed, please contact:
Mobolaji Kuti mkuti@babalakinandco.com
Clinton Elochukwu Wilson-Okereke cwilson-okereke@babalakinandco.com
Ayomide A. Sonaike asonaike@babalakinandco.com
References
[1] Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)
[2] Section 40(1) of the Administration of criminal Justice Act, 2015
[3] Section 121 Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015.
