The pursuit for accountability in Nigeria’s public sector has remained a defining and engaging issue in governance. The continuous abuse of office and illicit enrichment has continued to erode trust in public officials. In response, the Nigerian legal system, through the legislative framework established under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), particularly its Fifth Schedule, provides a system of regulating ethical conduct in public service. At the heart of this system is the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act (CCBTA), which enshrines the provisions of the Constitution on accountability in public service.
The Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal derive their authorities primarily from the 1999 Constitution. Section 153 of the Constitution establishes the Code of Conduct for Public Officers while section 158 guarantees its independence in exercising its functions.
Paragraph one of Part I of the Fifth Schedule mandates every public officer to observe and conform to the Code of Conduct. Paragraph eleven further requires public officers, within three months of the coming into force of the Code of Conduct or immediately after taking office, and thereafter at the end of every four years and at the end of their term of office, to declare their assets and liabilities, including those of their spouses and unmarried children under the age of eighteen, and to submit a written declaration containing these details to the Code of Conduct Bureau. In the case of a serving public officer, such declaration shall be made within thirty days of the receipt of the prescribed form from the Bureau or at such other intervals as the Bureau may specify.[1] In consequence, any false asset declaration upon verification is deemed to be a breach of Code of Conduct for public officer. [2]
Also, paragraph three (3) of Part I prohibits president, governor, their deputies, ministers, commissioners of the states government, members of the House of assembly and National Assembly as well as other officers seen as one by an Act of the National Assembly from operating a bank account in any country outside Nigeria while paragraph nine (9) prohibits abuse of office.[3]
There are other forms of conduct prohibited by the Constitution which public officers are not permitted to engage in, including the receipt of property, gifts, or any form of benefit by a public officer, or by any other person on his behalf, in respect of any act done in the discharge of his official duties.[4] Under paragraph twelve (12) of Part I, any allegation of breach shall be referred to the Code of Conduct Bureau, which may in turn refer the matter to the Code of Conduct Tribunal.
It must be stated that the rationale behind requiring public officers to declare their assets before assumption of office, periodically during their tenure (such as every four years), upon leaving office, and in accordance with other provisions on asset declaration, and also other provisions regulating the conduct and finances standing of public officers, is to promote transparency, accountability, and integrity in public service. By mandating these disclosures, the system facilitates the detection of illicit enrichment and conflicts of interest, ensuring that any unexplained increase in wealth can be scrutinised. It also serves as a deterrent against corruption, as public officers are aware that their financial status is subject to strict monitoring. Ultimately, this requirement strengthens public trust in governance by demonstrating a commitment to ethical conduct and responsible stewardship of public resources, and it aligns with the objectives underpinning the establishment of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act.
It is therefore a pertinent question whether these provisions are effectively achieving their intended purpose, and indeed whether the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act itself is fulfilling its core objectives.
The Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act (the Act) provides the statutory framework for implementing the constitutional provisions highlighted above. It establishes two key institutions: the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB/Bureau)[5] and the Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT)[6]
The Bureau is responsible for receiving, examining, and retaining asset declarations, as well as investigating complaints. The Tribunal, on the other hand, adjudicates cases of violations and imposes sanctions such as removal from office, disqualification, and forfeiture of assets.
4.0. Who is a Public Officer?
It is important to consider the category of public officers bound by the provisions of the Constitution and the Act. Consequently, it is necessary to review the definition of a “public officer” under the Act. The Act adopts a broad definition of a public officer, consistent with the Constitution, encompassing political office holders, civil servants, judicial officers, and employees of government agencies.
Public officers[7] covered include: the President and Vice-President; Governors and Deputy Governors; Ministers and Commissioners; members of the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly; Special Advisers; local government chairmen and councillors; judicial officers; members and staff of statutory corporations and government-owned companies; members of commissions and boards established by government; permanent secretaries and other civil servants; members of the armed forces, police, and other security agencies; and all other persons employed in the public service of the Federation, states, or local governments.
This expansive definition, in our opinion, will ensure that accountability mechanisms apply across all levels of governance, while also reinforcing the integrity of public administration. In fact, the ongoing reforms on local government autonomy will also influence the level of compliance with these provisions, as stronger local government independence may enhance responsibility, transparency, and adherence to constitutional and statutory accountability frameworks.
Asset declaration is the cornerstone of the Act under review. Public officers are required to declare their assets upon assumption of office, periodically, and upon exit.
This asset declaration system is meant to enhance public trust in governance by demonstrating a commitment to ethical standards and responsible governance and stewardship of public resources. It also provides a legal basis for investigation and potential prosecution where discrepancies or false declarations are identified. Essentially, by requiring full disclosure of financial interests, the regime seeks to establish a benchmark against which any unexplained increase in wealth can be assessed. It also serves as a deterrent against corrupt practices by placing public officers under serious and continuous scrutiny.
This process is supposed to act as a critical tool for the detection of illicit enrichment, abuse of office, and promoting transparency and accountability in governance. However, its effectiveness is largely contingent upon the presence of effective verification mechanisms, without which the objectives of this regime may be compromised and ultimately undermined.
6.0. Challenges and Weaknesses of the Effective Implementation of Asset Declaration by Public Officers under the Constitution and the Act.
The predicament of practical implementation of assets is not about lack of legal framework or principles. The constitutional and statutory framework governing asset declaration by public officers particularly under the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) is ultimately designed to promote transparency, accountability, and integrity in public service. However, several challenges and weaknesses continue to hinder its effective implementation in practice. This part of the article shall review different challenges affecting this and interrogate other reasons in respect of it.
The Bureau lacks the institutional and operational capacity required to effectively verify the large volume of asset declarations submitted by public officers and thereby undermining the effectiveness of the system. The sheer number of declarants across federal, state, and local government levels places a significant administrative burden on the Bureau. This challenge is compounded by limited manpower, inadequate funding, and the absence of specialised personnel with investigative and financial expertise. As a result, the Bureau is constrained in its ability to conduct thorough scrutiny or follow-up investigations on submitted declarations.
In addition, weak technological infrastructure, poor inter-agency collaboration and stakeholder engagements further diminish and weaken the verification process. The largely manual system makes it difficult to store, retrieve, and cross-check data efficiently, while the lack of access to external databases, such as property records also contribute in limiting independent validation. Consequently, many asset declarations are merely received and archived without proper verification, and therefore, reducing the process to a formal obligation based on self-disclosure. This significantly weakens the integrity and credibility of the asset declaration regime, as false or incomplete declarations may go undetected.
Another significant challenge affecting the effectiveness of the asset declaration regime is the absence of a robust and systematic auditing framework. The current structure under the Code of Conduct Bureau does not provide for regular, independent, and comprehensive audits of declared assets to ensure accuracy and detect inconsistencies over time. In practice, asset declarations are often submitted and retained without periodic audit verification, which limits the ability of the system to track changes in wealth or identify unexplained enrichment.
The weakness of the auditing mechanism is further compounded by the lack of specialised audit units equipped with forensic accounting capacity and modern investigative tools. This creates significant gaps in post-declaration scrutiny, allowing discrepancies to go unnoticed unless triggered by external complaints or whistleblowing. Moreover, there currently exists no structured audit cycle and clear statutory requirements for routine verification weakens preventive oversight and reduces the regime to a largely passive disclosure system. Consequently, the deterrent and monitoring functions of asset declaration are significantly undermined.
Even where irregularities are detected, enforcement action is often slow, inconsistent, and procedurally constrained. For example, delays frequently arise in the investigation and referral of cases from Bureau to Tribunal, largely due to bureaucratic bottlenecks and the absence of clearly defined timelines within the governing framework. Such delays may result in prolonged proceedings, sometimes extending beyond the tenure of the public officer concerned, thereby undermining the objective of timely accountability.
Furthermore, enforcement is often weakened by procedural and jurisdictional challenges that arise during prosecution proceedings. Issues such as preliminary objections, challenges to jurisdiction, and interlocutory appeals can significantly stall proceedings before the Tribunal. In addition, the limited investigative and prosecutorial powers of the Bureau constrain its ability to independently and efficiently pursue cases. The apparent inconsistency in the application of sanctions, as well as the inadequate follow-through on penalties such as asset forfeiture or disqualification from office, further illustrates the delicacy of the enforcement process. As a whole, these factors diminish the deterrent effect of the law and weaken its capacity to ensure compliance among public officers.
Additionally, the asset declaration system is further undermined by institutional challenges, particularly in respect to transparency and access to information. The principle of transparency, as provided for in the Freedom of Information Act 2011, is to create a presumption in favor of disclosure of information in possession or control of public institutions, except in instances where there are exemptions based on considerations of national security, law enforcement, public interest and privacy. Significantly, under this Act, any member of society is entitled to access information in possession of a public institution without having to demonstrate a particular interest in such information,[8] therefore promoting transparency, accountability, and participatory governance. However, this exemption is not to be construed as a general justification for non-disclosure, but is to be applied restrictively and only in exceptional cases where non-disclosure would cause significant harm, with particular reference to exemptions based on privacy in a strict observance of the principles of necessity and proportionationality.
Efficiency of the asset declaration regime is also impaired by political interference and institutional limitations. In some instances, there is political interference in the enforcement process, which affects the independence and impartiality of the regime. Further, there are other challenges affecting Bureau, which include inadequate personnel, lack of adequate funding, and operational autonomy limitations. These have definitely and significantly impaired the Bureau’s ability to effectively monitor, investigate, and verify the vast number of asset declaration forms received. These problems have impaired the effectiveness of the regime in deterring corruption and enhancing accountability.
In the light of these challenges, there is a clear need for practical and institutional reforms to strengthen the effectiveness of the asset declaration regime in Nigeria. The following recommendations are therefore proposed:
To address inadequate verification capacity, there is a need for significant institutional strengthening of the Bureau through increased funding, recruitment of specialised personnel, and deployment of modern digital infrastructure for asset tracking and verification. In addition, the Bureau should be empowered to engage professional firms, particularly reputable law firms and forensic auditing firms, as independent verification and investigation agents. Law firms are particularly well-positioned due to their expertise in regulatory compliance, investigative due diligence, corporate governance, and asset tracing in both civil and criminal contexts. Their professional independence, ethical obligations, and experience in handling complex financial and property-related investigations would enhance credibility, reduce administrative burden on the Bureau, and improve the accuracy of verification outcomes. Such outsourcing would also introduce a layer of external scrutiny that strengthens transparency and reduces institutional bottlenecks.
To improve enforcement efficiency, it is recommended that Code of Conduct Tribunals be decentralised and established across all states and local government areas of the federation. This reform would bring enforcement mechanisms closer to grassroots governance structures, ensuring quicker adjudication of asset declaration breaches and reducing the delays associated with centralised proceedings. In light of the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence affirming local government financial autonomy,[9] decentralised tribunals would also reinforce accountability at the local level, where significant public funds are managed. Such institutional expansion would enhance accessibility to justice, reduce case backlog, and strengthen deterrence by ensuring that disciplinary processes are timely, visible, and effective across all tiers of government.
To complement the Bureau’s internal mechanisms, there should be the creation of Independent Verification and Investigation Agents (IVIAs) licensed and regulated by Bureau. These agents would conduct discreet background checks, forensic asset tracing, and lifestyle audits of declarants using structured investigative frameworks. Their reports would be submitted to the Bureau for review and possible enforcement action. The use of independent agents introduces professional skepticism into the system, reduces institutional bias, and enhances credibility. It also fosters continuous monitoring rather than periodic or reactive enforcement. These agents could be drawn from certified investigators, forensic accountants, and legal practitioners with demonstrable expertise in compliance and anti-corruption investigations.
To strengthen enforcement, there is a need to streamline procedural rules governing investigations and Tribunal proceedings by introducing statutory timelines for investigation, prosecution, and adjudication. This would help reduce unnecessary delays often caused by interlocutory applications, procedural technicalities, and jurisdictional preliminary objection. In addition, the Code of Conduct Bureau should be granted enhanced prosecutorial autonomy to reduce overdependence on external agencies, which frequently contributes to delays and inefficiencies in enforcement actions.
Furthermore, consideration should be given to the appointment of special private prosecutors or independent prosecutorial counsel with defined mandates to support the prosecution of asset declaration-related offences. Such appointments would introduce specialised expertise, improve case management efficiency, and reduce institutional bottlenecks.
Although confidentiality is a recognised feature of asset declaration systems, it should not be used as a blanket justification for non-disclosure. Therefore, reforms should ensure a balanced application of the Freedom of Information Act principles, allowing access to asset declaration data in appropriate circumstances, particularly where public interest outweighs privacy concerns. A structured disclosure framework where certain categories of information are periodically published or made accessible to oversight institutions would enhance transparency without compromising personal security. This approach would reinforce accountability while maintaining necessary safeguards.
In conclusion, while the asset declaration regime under the constitutional and statutory framework is a vital mechanism for promoting transparency, accountability, and integrity in public service, its effectiveness remains significantly constrained by institutional, operational, and enforcement challenges. Issues such as weak verification capacity, inadequate enforcement mechanisms, lack of effective auditing systems, limited transparency, and political interference collectively undermine its intended objectives. Strengthening the system therefore requires comprehensive reforms, including improved institutional capacity, greater transparency, decentralised enforcement structures, and the integration of independent professional support to ensure a more credible and effective asset declaration framework.
Reference
[1] Section 15(1) c of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act.
[2] Paragraph 11 (2) of the Fifth Schedule, Part I of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999 as amended).
[3] Abuse of Office is that a public officer shall not do or direct to be done in abuse of his office, any arbitrary act prejudicial to the rights of any other persons knowing that such act is unlawful.
[4] Paragraphs 6 and 8 of the Fifth Schedule, Part I of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999 as amended).
[5] Section 1(1) of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act
[6] Section 20 of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act
[7] Part II, Fifth Schedule of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999 as amended).
[8] Section 1(1) and (2) of the Freedom of Information Act 2011.
[9] AG Federation v. AG Abia State & Ors (2024) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1966)
