Facts
The Respondent commenced the suit at the High Court of Akwa Ibom State in 2008, by a Writ of Summons. Following a series of interlocutory applications in which leave was granted to the Respondent, the writ was subsequently amended. However, before the commencement of trial, the Appellant filed a preliminary objection contending that both the original and the amended writs were defective ab initio on the ground that the original writ was not signed by counsel and that the amended writ could not cure that defect. After hearing the parties, the trial court dismissed the objection.
Dissatisfied with the ruling of the trial court, the Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. Still dissatisfied, the Appellant further appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the decision of the lower court on three grounds.
Issue for Determination
The Supreme Court adopted the sole issue formulated by the Appellant in its determination of the appeal, to wit:
“Whether the lower court was right in holding that the writ of summons was properly filed before the trial court once it was signed by the Registrar of the said court even though it was not signed by the Legal Practitioner who issued same.”
Argument
Counsel for the Appellant argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine the suit because the originating Writ of Summons was not signed by counsel for the Respondent and was therefore incurably defective. He contended that the original writ bore only the name and address of counsel, without any signature. He faulted the reliance of the respondent on the provisions of High Court of Akwa Ibom State (Civil Procedure), 1989, arguing that requirement for signing is not dependent on whether a specific rule of court expressly mandates it. He contended that such rules cannot override a foundational requirement established by statute and binding precedent. In support of his position, he cited the cases of BUHARI v ADEBAYO (2022) 13 NWLR (PT. 1848) 533 (SC) AT 598–599; ASHAKA v NWACHUKWU (2024) 9 NWLR (PT. 1942) 149 (SC) AT 173, PARA. D; and NETWORK SECURITIES LTD. v DAHIRU (2022) 14 NWLR (PT. 1850) 351 (SC) AT 374. Counsel relied further on Section 91(4) of the Evidence Act, 1990, which requires documents to be signed or otherwise authenticated by their makers, and argued that the provision has constitutional force by virtue of Section 315(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). He also placed reliance on judicial authorities such as OKAFOR v NWEKE (2007) 10 NWLR (PT. 1043) 521 (SC) and SLB CONSORTIUM LTD. v NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR (PT. 1252) 317 (SC) to submit that proper authentication of court processes is fundamental.
