Muhammad Yasin Abdulmumin & Hammed Akorede Awe
Abstract
This article examines the decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Adebo v. Executive Governor of Oyo State & 2 Ors (2026) 6 NWLR (Pt. 2038) 81 wherein the Court clarified the scope and limitations of the principle of fortissime contra preferentes in relation to revocation of rights of occupancy under section 28 of the Land Use Act 1978.
Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that section 28 does not expressly require a notice of revocation to particularize the specific public purpose for which the right of occupancy is revoked, the Court held that the principle of fortissime contra preferentes cannot be deployed as a technical weapon to invalidate the exercise of executive powers where the revocation is undertaken in good faith and for a genuine overriding public interest. Consequently, a revocation effected for a legitimate public purpose, accompanied by due notice and substantial compliance with statutory requirements, will not be rendered invalid merely because the notice fails to state the public purpose with considerable detail or technical precision.
The article traces the evolution of Nigerian jurisprudence on the validity of revocation notices, analyses the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Adebo, and evaluates the implications of the decision for land administration, compulsory acquisition, litigation strategy, and the constitutional balance between private proprietary rights and governmental powers under the Land Use Act.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Adebo v. Gov., Oyo State & 2 Ors[1] provides much-needed clarity on the jurisprudence governing the revocation of rights of occupancy under the Land Use Act.[2] In particular, the decision revisits the judicial application of the principle of fortissime contra preferentes[3], an interpretive rule that statutes conferring powers of compulsory acquisition must be construed strictly against the acquiring authority and sympathetically in favour of the affected citizen.
Prior to Adebo, Nigerian courts had frequently relied on this principle to insist that a notice of revocation must expressly state the specific public purpose for which the right of occupancy was revoked, notwithstanding the absence of any such express requirement in section 28 of the Land Use Act. The Supreme Court in Adebo reconsidered this position and clarified the contextual limits of the doctrine.
Historically, the principle of fortissime contra preferentes emerged from English expropriation jurisprudence[4] as a safeguard against arbitrary interference with proprietary rights. The doctrine reflects the judicial attitude that statutes authorizing compulsory acquisition must be strictly construed because they derogate from private property rights. Nigerian courts subsequently incorporated this principle into local jurisprudence, particularly in disputes concerning compulsory acquisition and revocation of land rights.
One of the earliest notable applications of the doctrine in Nigeria appeared in Chief Commissioner, Eastern Provinces v. S.N. Ononye & Ors[5], where Waddington J. emphasised that the acquiring authority must demonstrate the existence of a genuine public purpose and avoid any appearance of abuse of power. Over time, courts expanded the doctrine to require that the public purpose itself be expressly stated in the notice of revocation. This approach was reinforced in several subsequent authorities, particularly where the surrounding circumstances suggested bad faith, ulterior motive, or abuse of statutory powers[6].
However, the broad and sometimes mechanical application of the principle gradually encouraged litigants to challenge otherwise valid revocations on purely procedural or technical grounds, even where the existence of a genuine public purpose was evident. This produced doctrinal uncertainty regarding the proper relationship between procedural safeguards and substantive governmental powers under section 28 of the Land Use Act.
It was against this background that the Supreme Court in Adebo confronted what Abubakar J.S.C. described as “a legal conundrum at the intersection of land administration, constitutional authority and the exercise of executive power in the name of public interest[7].” The Court ultimately adopted a more purposive and pragmatic interpretation of section 28 in line with the doctrine of fortissime contra preferentes, holding that the validity of a revocation depends principally on the existence of a genuine overriding public interest and compliance with due process, rather than on technical perfection in the wording of the notice.
The decision therefore represents an important doctrinal shift in Nigerian land law jurisprudence. While preserving the protective function of fortissime contra preferentes, the Court clarified that the doctrine is not an inflexible instrument for frustrating legitimate governmental action undertaken in good faith. This article situates the decision within the broader jurisprudential landscape, analyses the reasoning of the Supreme Court, and evaluates its implications for land administration and compulsory acquisition litigation in Nigeria.
By virtue of the Land Use Act, the Governor of a State holds all land within the State in trust for the use and common benefit of the people.[8] In that capacity, the Governor is empowered to revoke rights of occupancy, whether statutory or customary, for overriding public interest or for the purposes of the State or Federal Government.[9]
This power is not, however, unfettered. It is exercised subject to clearly defined statutory safeguards, namely the notice requirements and the compensation regime. In particular, a valid revocation must be preceded by the issuance and service of a notice of revocation on the holder or occupier of the land.[10] Such notice must be issued under the hand of a duly authorised public officer acting on behalf of the Governor.[11] Upon receipt by the holder, or on such later date as may be specified therein, the right of occupancy, together with any unexpired term or residual proprietary interest is extinguished.[12] Where revocation extinguishes the holder’s proprietary interest, the law preserves a right to compensation in limited respects, such as for unexhausted improvements and specific acquisitions for mining or pipeline purposes.[13]
From the statutory scheme, two essential conditions emerge for the valid exercise of the power of revocation: first, overriding public interest, the revocation must be grounded in a legitimate public purpose recognised by law; and secondly, due notice, there must be proper issuance and service of a notice of revocation on the holder or occupier. It is the content requirements of this notice that lay at the heart of the controversy authoritatively resolved in Adebo.
The decisions of the Supreme Court, as the apex court in the Nigerian judicial hierarchy,[14] are of immense jurisprudential value in shaping the understanding and application of section 28 of the Land Use Act. It bears emphasis that the Supreme Court is not merely a court of law but also a court of public policy, often intervening to correct legal and societal imbalances and to reconcile competing constitutional and proprietary interests.[15] This places a considerable responsibility on the Court to ensure that the interpretation of statutory powers accords not only with the text of the law but also with the broader demands of justice and public policy.
This role is evident in the Court’s evolving interpretation of section 28 of the Land Use Act, especially through the application of principle of fortissme contra proferentes. Nigerian courts have historically invoked this doctrine as a protective mechanism against arbitrary or abusive exercises of compulsory acquisition powers.
One of the earliest notable applications of the principle appeared in Obikoya & Sons Ltd. v. Governor of Lagos State,[16] where the Court frowned upon both the non-service of notice and the issuance of a blanket notice of revocation devoid of specific reasons. Applying the principle of fortissime contra preferentes in construing the Lagos Town Planning Act, the Court insisted on strict compliance with procedural safeguards notwithstanding the absence of any express statutory requirement that the public purpose be specifically stated in the notice of revocation. The decision became one of the foundational authorities for the proposition that expropriation statutes must be interpreted strictly against the acquiring authority in order to protect private proprietary rights.
The doctrine received further judicial endorsement in L.S.D.P.C. v. Banire,[17] where the respondent challenged the revocation and subsequent reallocation of his property on grounds of non-service of notice and absence of genuine public purpose. The Court of Appeal held that where statutory powers encroach upon proprietary rights, strict compliance with procedural safeguards is imperative. Accordingly, such statutes must be construed fortissime contra preferentes i.e., strictly against the acquiring authority and sympathetically in favour of the affected citizen. The Court invalidated the purported service effected on tenants rather than the actual holder of the right of occupancy and further held that a notice merely stating “public purpose” without specifying its nature was insufficient. Relying on Chief Commissioner, Eastern Provinces v. S.N. Ononye & Ors[18], the Court reasoned that failure to disclose the nature of the public purpose may justify the inference that no genuine public purpose exists.
This approach was reinforced by Tobi J.S.C. (as he then was) in Provost, LACOED v. Edun,[19] where the revocation and subsequent reallocation of the respondent’s land were invalidated for failure to provide proper notice and for failure to specify the relevant public purpose. His Lordship emphasised that a notice of acquisition must clearly disclose the public purpose contemplated by the applicable law.
Similarly, in C.S.S. Bookshops Ltd v. R.T.M.C.R.S.,[20] the Supreme Court reaffirmed that statutes authorising compulsory acquisition must be construed strictly against the acquiring authority and sympathetically in favour of the property owner. The Court held that where a right of occupancy is revoked for public purpose, the notice ought to clearly state that purpose, particularly where the exercise of the power is attended by illegality or procedural irregularity.
The principle was equally applied in Orianzi v. A.G. Rivers State & Ors,[21] where Eko J.S.C. affirmed that a holder of a right of occupancy is entitled not only to notice of revocation but also to have the public purpose clearly stated therein. The Court further recognised the holder’s right to be heard, underscoring the Governor’s duty to act fairly even where the power exercised is administrative rather than judicial.
The common thread running through these decisions is that the judicial insistence founded on the principle of fortissime contra preferentes is rooted in the need to moderate the far-reaching nature of compulsory acquisition powers and to prevent abuse. It operates as a critical check on executive authority, ensuring that the power to revoke is exercised strictly in furtherance of genuine public purposes. The invocation of fortissime contra preferentes in the adjudication of issues under section 28 is therefore contextual, not absolute, a principle applied in deserving circumstances, not a blanket inhibition on governmental power.
However, the broad and increasingly mechanical application of the doctrine gradually transformed what began as a contextual interpretive safeguard into an almost inflexible procedural requirement. Consequently, litigants increasingly relied on technical objections relating to the wording of revocation notices to challenge otherwise lawful exercises of executive power, even where the existence of genuine overriding public interest was apparent. This development generated doctrinal uncertainty and ultimately necessitated the authoritative intervention of the Supreme Court in Adebo v. Executive Governor of Oyo State & 2 Ors.
The dispute arose from the revocation and repurposing of a land situated within the vicinity of the Government House in Oyo State. The Oyo State Government and its Ministry of Lands issued a notice of forfeiture to Mr Adebo, the holder of a statutory right of occupancy, informing him that his interest in the land had been revoked on grounds of overriding public interest and national security. The revocation was grounded on the land’s proximity to the Government House and its perceived unsuitability for private ownership for security reasons.
Dissatisfied, the appellant commenced proceedings before the High Court of Oyo State, seeking declarations that the revocation was null, void, and of no legal effect. The High Court dismissed the claims, holding that the revocation was validly made for overriding public purpose on the uncontroverted evidence adduced at trial. The Court of Appeal, Ibadan Division, affirmed this decision. Undeterred, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
The central question before the Supreme Court was whether “the instrument of revocation was invalid for failing to expressly state the specific public purpose for which the appellant’s right of occupancy was revoked.”
The appellant, relying on the established body of authorities, submitted that the Governor’s power under section 28 of the Land Use Act is strictly circumscribed by procedural requirements, including the obligation to clearly state the precise public purpose in the notice of revocation established under the principle of fortissime contra preferentes. It was contended that failure to do so renders the notice a nullity, irrespective of any inferred or subsequent justification. Particular reliance was placed on C.S.S. Bookshops Ltd v. R.T.M.C.R.S., Nigeria Engineering Works Ltd. v. Denap Ltd.,[22] Provost, LACOED v. Edun (supra), and L.S.D.P.C. v. Banire (supra). Counsel maintained that any departure from this settled position would constitute a grave affront to the doctrine of precedent.
The respondents, on the other hand, maintained that the procedural safeguards under section 28 in particular, the issuance and service of the notice, were duly complied with. They argued that the statute imposes no mandatory requirement that the specific public purpose be expressly stated in the notice itself; it was sufficient that the surrounding facts and evidence disclosed a legitimate public purpose and no inherent ill exercise of expropriating power. They further noted that the land had since been landscaped into part of the secured premises of the Government House, consistently with the asserted public purpose.
It is settled law that although the Supreme Court is bound by the doctrine of stare decisis[23], but it is not totally fettered by precedent.[24] The apex Court retains the authority to revisit its previous decisions where there exists a compelling justification for reconsidering the law in the interest of justice, legal coherence, or public policy.[25]
Acting as jus dicere, the Court interpreted section 28 of the Land Use Act and found that the statute imposes no express requirement that the specific purpose of revocation be stated in the notice. The true yardsticks for valid revocation are two: (i) genuine public purpose; and (ii) due process in the giving of notice. While acknowledging the body of case law that had read in a requirement for specificity of purpose through the application of fortissime contra preferentes, the Court drew an important distinction. The principle, the court held, remains an interpretive safeguard against arbitrary or bad-faith exercises of compulsory acquisition powers; however, it is not an inflexible technical rule for invalidating otherwise lawful governmental action undertaken in good faith and for legitimate public purposes.
The Court therefore clarified that though the application of the principle of fortissime contra preferentes may have imported that the precise public purpose be particularised in the notice itself despite the absence of such requirement in the text of the statute, such interpretive rule is unnecessary “where credible evidence exists showing that the revocation was in fact undertaken for a genuine public purpose recognised by law”. In the instant case, the uncontroverted evidence before the Court established that the acquired property had been incorporated into the secured vicinity of the Government House for security and governmental purposes. Consequently, the revocation could not be invalidated merely because the notice failed to expressly particularise the exact nature of the public purpose.
The decision significantly recalibrates the application of the principle of fortissime contra preferentes within Nigerian compulsory acquisition jurisprudence. The Court effectively confined the doctrine to situations where the surrounding circumstances disclose illegality, bad faith, abuse of power, or absence of genuine public purpose. Mere technical imperfections or lack of detailed description of the public purposes of acquisition in the wording of a revocation notice, without more, are insufficient to nullify an otherwise valid exercise of statutory power.
In the Court’s own formulation, “[t]he procedural safeguards of the Land Use Act are protective, not punitive.” To read into section 28 a textual requirement not imposed by the legislature would, according to the Court, amount to impermissible judicial legislation. The appeal was accordingly dismissed for want of merit.
The decision in Adebo carries significant consequences for land administration, litigation strategy, and the jurisprudence of the Land Use Act. By clarifying that section 28 of the Land Use Act does not expressly require a notice of revocation to particularise the specific public purpose, the Supreme Court has shifted the focus of judicial inquiry from technical compliance with form to the evidentiary substantive legitimacy of the acquisition itself.
At the same time, the Court did not completely displace the principle of fortissime contra preferentes. Rather, the decision confines its application to circumstances involving bad faith, abuse of power, illegality, or absence of genuine public purpose. The principle therefore remains an important constitutional safeguard against arbitrary executive action, albeit one to be applied contextually rather than mechanically.
More broadly, the decision reflects a movement towards a purposive interpretation of expropriation statutes under Nigerian law and redefines the balance between private proprietary rights and the practical necessities of governmental administration under the Land Use Act.
The decision in Adebo v. Executive Governor of Oyo State & 2 Ors provides a decisive restatement of the relationship between section 28 of the Land Use Act and the interpretive principle of fortissime contra preferentes. The Supreme Court made clear that while the doctrine remains relevant as a tool for construing expropriation statutes, it cannot be used to import into section 28 a requirement that a revocation notice must expressly state the specific public purpose.
In addition, the doctrine of fortissime contra preferentes remains extant but its application is confined to cases where there is evidence of bad faith, illegality, or abuse of power. Put differently, once credible evidence establishes that the acquisition is for genuine public purpose, the interpretive rule that revocation notice must contain particular becomes dispensable. Outside these circumstances, the validity of a revocation turns on compliance with the statutory requirements of due process and the existence of a genuine overriding public interest, not on strict technical precision in the wording of the notice.
In effect, the decision restores primacy to the text of the Land Use Act while preserving the doctrine as a safeguard against abuse rather than a rigid rule of invalidation. It thus strikes a clearer balance between strict statutory interpretation and purposive protection of proprietary rights in the exercise of compulsory acquisition powers.
Reference
[1]Adebo v. Gov., Oyo State & 2 Ors (2026) 6 NWLR (Pt. 2038) 81.
[2]Land Use Act, 1978; Cap. L5, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.
[3]i.e., strictly against the acquiring authority but sympathetically in favour of the citizen whose property rights are being deprived.
[4] East Riding County Council vs. Park Estate (Bridlington) Ltd. (1957) A. C. 223; Re Bowman, South Shields (Thames Street) Clearance Order 1931 (1932) 2 K. B. 621 at 633; Westminister vs. London and North Western Railway Company (1905) A. C. 426 page 430
[5] (1944) 17 N.L.R. pages 143-144
[6] Bello, Alhaji Y.A.O. vs The Diocesan Synod of Lagos & 2 ORS (1973) ALL NLR at 196.
[7] Adebo v. Gov., Oyo State & 2 Ors (supra) 81 at 97 para-G
[8]Section 1 of the Land Use Act.
[9]The Governor has the power to revoke a right of occupancy where there is an overriding public interest. What constitutes overriding public interest differs depending on the type of right of occupancy held. For a statutory right of occupancy, revocation may occur where: the occupier unlawfully alienates the land (by assignment, mortgage, sublease, or transfer) in breach of the Act; the land is required by the State Government, a Local Government, or the Federal Government for public purposes; or the land is needed for mining, oil pipelines, or related purposes. For a customary right of occupancy, the grounds are broader and include: government or Local Government acquisition for public purposes; mining or oil pipeline requirements; extraction of building materials; and unauthorised alienation of the land by the occupier, whether by sale, assignment, mortgage, sublease, bequest, or any other means without the required consent or approval. Section 28(2) & (3) of the Land Use Act.
[10]Section 28(4) of the Land Use Act.
[11]Section 28(6) of the Land Use Act.
[12]Section 28(7) of the Land Use Act.
[13]Section 29 of the Land Use Act.
[14]ARCON v. Fassassi (No. 4) (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 43; Uwemedimo v. Mobil Prod. (Nig.) Unltd. (2022) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1813) 53.
[15]Saleh v. Abah (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1578) 100.
[16]Obikoya & Sons Ltd. v. Governor of Lagos State (1987) 1 NWLR 385.
[17]L.S.D.P.C. v. Banire (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 243) 620.
[18]Chief Commissioner, Eastern Provinces v. N. Ononye & 5 Ors (1944) 17 NLR 142 at 143.
[19]Provost, LACOED v. Edun (2004) 6 NWLR (Pt. 870) 476.
[20]C.S.S. Bookshops Ltd v. R.T.M.C.R.S. (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 992) 530.
[21]Orianzi v. A.G. Rivers State & Ors (2017) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1561) 224.
[22]Nigeria Engineering Works Ltd. v. Denap Ltd. (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 746) 726.
[23]SCC (Nig.) Ltd. v. Joseph (2026) 1 NWLR (Pt. 2025) 227; Crestar Int. Nat. Res. Ltd. v. S.P.D.C.N. Ltd. (2021) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1800) 453.
[24] In NDPHC LTD v. MICHAEL(2024) LPELR-79937(SC) the Supreme Court held at pages 29-31 this: “…The doctrine of stare decisis, which is an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what the law is and its application to individual cases and therefore, vital to our legal system is not inflexible. The doctrine provides at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal rules. At the same time, it allows for the law to evolve to meet the demands of justice and societal progression especially in a dynamic society. Nonetheless, rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and unduly restrict the proper development of the law. In considering whether to depart from a past decision or not, this Court must evaluate whether adherence to the precedent would perpetuate injustice or is no longer applicable due to changes in legal or societal contexts, as I earlier stated the dynamic nature of our development as an organised society will be held captive where recourse is had to rigid and blind adherence to precedent or adherence to precedent is placed over and above the demands for doing substantial justice, and charting more meaningful interpretation to the clear intent and purpose of the provisions of the Constitution. In my humble view, the previous decision of this Court in AMALE V. SOKOTO LOCAL GOVERNMENT (supra) which unduly restricted the scope of enforcement of the fundamental right to property guaranteed under Section 44(1) of the Constitution, is with all due respect no longer helpful to our current state of development, the continued application of the decision will visit harm and injury to public interest and ultimately defeat the ends of justice, and occasion mishap. By narrowly applying the provision of the FREP Rules and Section 44(1) of the Constitution, the decision has potentially barred genuine grievances from being heard and inadvertently de-recognised the right to property duly guaranteed under the Constitution, thereby undermining the essence of fundamental rights protection. As Lord Denning, MR. held in OSTIME V. AUSTRALIAN MUTUAL PROVIDENT SOCIETY [1960] AC 459 (HL), “the doctrine of precedent does not compel your Lordships to follow the wrong path until you fall over the edge of the cliff.” Clearly, to rectify an error in previous decisions is a form of judicial humility prompted by the compulsion of judicial conscience as every judge, including those of us in this Court, must be courageous enough to admit that we are fallible, and a trip is incidental to the discharge of our duty as fallible beings, taking the position to mend is a demonstration of courage, humility, morality and good conscience. See UMED V. RAJ SINGH AIR (1975) SC (INDIA) 43. While the decision in AMALE V. SOKOTO LOCAL GOVERNMENT (supra) enumerates and provides valuable guidance on the factors to be considered in determining appropriate cases which fall under the FREP Rules, the conclusion in that case, which has similar facts to the facts of this case, presented different approach which I with all due respect differ…”
[25]Akintokun v. L.P.D.C. (2014) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1423) 1.
